Inter/national Computing Practices in Czechoslovakia and Finland, 1945-1970 petri paju and helena durnová abstract. The development and transfer of computing technology in postwar Czechoslovakia and Finland, two countries lying directly on the border between the two cold war blocs, were shaped by a mix of factors, from the political to the technological, in both countries. This article describes and analyzes the factors influencing the transfer of computing technology in cold war Europe on the basis of comparison of the national histories of these two frontier countries. Although the first computers were put into operation in the two countries during the second half of the 1950s, Czechoslovakia's industrial tradition concealed its gradual lagging behind Finland. During the postwar decade, the possibility of the transfer of computing technology and practices was a crucial factor in the spreading of computing technology in both countries. It was the commercial transfer of computers from the West to Finland that made their availability there, until the mid-1970s, relatively grow to three times that of Czechoslovakia. However, while the physical transfer of actual computers across the Iron Curtain was difficult, the intangible transfer of related ideas, designs, and practices was much easier. Moreover, it was not only politics that affected this technological development, but technology was also used to affect politics and form political ties.
IntroduCtIon
Apart from being a political and military confrontation between the Western and Soviet blocs, the cold war was also a technological battle for supremacy. The competition between the two strongest opponents, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the exploration of space is well-known, and the situation was quite similar with other big technologies, which during the 1950s and '60s December 2009 included computing technology. In addition to politics, the cold war had its material components, of which the transfer of computing technologies and practices is of primary interest in this article. Digital technology was a recent invention and of great interest after World War II, people from all over Europe traveling to the United States or United Kingdom to learn more about it and returning home inspired by its possible applications.
In the emerging cold war in Europe, a crucial hindrance for technology transfers was the Iron Curtain, the border named by Winston Churchill in 1946 that divided the countries of Europe into east and west. In each country, regardless of its political system, there were groups who believed in the importance of the future of computers, and for most of whom the divide between east and west existed only as an obstacle standing in the way of free communication. The growing political polarization presented various challenges for European countries, especially for the smaller ones, where technological transfers from abroad were even more necessary than in larger countries.
In the decades after World War II, the spread of computer technology was affected by a combination of existing local histories of computing, various simultaneous inventions throughout the industrial world, and technology transfers (see also Cortada, 2008) . A number of analysts have described how the Marshall Plan-officially, the European Recovery Program-and other U.S. policies and programs were important for the transfer of technology, mostly to Western Europe after World War II (Kipping & Tiratsoo, 2002; Krige, 2006; Schlombs, 2008a, pp. 44-45; Zeitlin & Herrigel, 2000) . But how did the transfer of computer technology evolve in individual countries, especially those on the border of the Iron Curtain? What was the role played by the recipient countries' own innovativeness or activities in the transfer? To take the analysis further, we propose to study the reverse influence: Did the technology transfer, in turn, play a role in how the cold war unfolded in these countries?
It is intrinsically problematic to study the interplay of the cold war and computing based on the example of one country, since through that approach, it is difficult to distinguish among the various factors of influence, such as which is a result of national development and which is a consequence of U.S. or Soviet influence? For example, in the 1950s, owing to financial and other constraints, most of the smaller European countries would have had only one central group active in the research and development of computing, which to a large extent influenced its early developments there. We therefore present a juxtaposition of the cases of Czechoslovakia and Finland in order to highlight the differences between East and West Europe, since both countries are roughly comparable, lying directly on the border of the Iron Curtain and declining participation in the Marshall Plan. Despite these similarities, their respective paths of development in computing diverged during the period under study here, from post-World War II to the early 1970s.
We study technology transfer not as a passive process of simply moving technological artifacts from one place to another, but as the active interaction between stakeholders, with an emphasis on the recipient's own desire to develop them and the diffusion of technology inside the country, taking into account the role of users in embracing the new technology. Furthermore, we pay close attention to the obstacles of technology transfer that resulted in particular from political pressure and its consequences. We also carefully examine the contexts of transfer, especially the recipients' contexts (Myllyntaus, 1991; Seely, 2003) .
1 After examining the postwar political positions of Czechoslovakia and Finland, we proceed to compare the studying, developing, and transferring of computer technology in both recipient countries. We then identify how in both, the "western" technology became the desired model, albeit through very different channels and forms, and how these differences likely resulted from the respective positions of the two countries at the crossroads of international interactions determined by cold war circumstances. We conclude that in both countries, much of the subsequent transfer and exploitation of computer technology were indirectly conditioned by their respective political changes in 1948. Further, we discuss how during the cold war period, these politically turbulent circumstances influenced the roles and possibilities of their scientists and users as well as their political and economic systems, thus collectively producing dissimilarities in the development of computerization in Czechoslovakia and Finland.
ImmedIately after the War: dIfferent InfluenCes of the sovIet unIon
Czechoslovakia: Promoting a Centrally Planned Economy
The position of Czechoslovakia on the political map of Europe was most probably determined even before its 1946 election, in which the Communist Party gained a plurality of votes-receiving 38%, the most of all the parties involved (Netík, 1982) . Historians nevertheless regard the immediate postwar years as a time when the alignment of Czechoslovakia with the Eastern Bloc could still have been questioned or even averted (Veber, 2008) . The reasons for these speculations are most likely due to the hopes then of resurrecting the prewar Czechoslovakia, the state that had emerged after World War I with the progressive ideas of T. G. Masaryk (1850 Masaryk ( -1937 , philosopher and the country's first president ). Masaryk's ideas, which were so influential during the interwar period, were strongly opposed by the communists though they were still appealing to the educated classes. Masaryk, like the computer pioneer An-tonín Svoboda, regarded Switzerland as the model for Czechoslovakia. In the late 1940s, the communists also used the 1930s worldwide economic crisis as an argument against the democratic parties' economic programs. As early as October 1945, several months before the first postwar election, 60-75% (depending on the methodology used) of the economy was nationalized-that is, owned by the state-including all banks and enterprises with more than 400 employees. Such early nationalization could not have been imposed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and thus reveals either a consensus among all domestic political parties or external influence by the Soviet Union.
The Marshall Plan was officially offered to Czechoslovakia, but it was rejected on the basis of an order from the Soviet Union. Consequently, its trade with western European countries decreased, and its economic ties with eastern Europe and the Balkans were established. According to some sources, the Marshall Plan would have been implemented in Czechoslovakia only if there were no communists in the government. Historian Zdeněk Veselý (1987) quotes Edvard Beneš, the president of postwar Czechoslovakia, on this point: "If the Americans were wise, they would realize that the best way to fight communism is to grant the loan to the governments such as the Czechoslovak one, where the communists are strong, but do not have the majority. With such a loan, Czechoslovakia would make [such progress] that the communists would be discredited in two years." Instead, after officially rejecting the Marshall Plan, Czechoslovakia would face further difficulties resulting from the help offered to other European countries. For instance, when in September 1947 the Czechoslovakian embassy made inquiries concerning the obstacles the country might experience with regard to the import of machines and equipment, the U.S. response was revealing: while these machines were not under embargo, their export might be delayed or else be in lesser quantity than would have been the case under the Marshall Plan (Kaplan, 1995) . Also, western European companies such as IBM, Philips, Siemens, AEG, and others gradually withdrew from Czechoslovakia.
Despite this lack of U.S. support and the withdrawal of western companies, courses on computing began in Czechoslovakia three years after the end of World War II-nearly a decade before similar courses in Finland. Svoboda and Zdeněk Trnka went on a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)-sponsored trip to England in 1947 to learn about the most recent developments in computing technology.
2 While Trnka concentrated on analog computers, Svoboda was more interested in digital-computing technology, and upon their return, they started their respective courses at the Czech Technical University in Prague. Apparently these local developments in computing followed very much the western European pattern of the time, al-though during the 1950s, the environment changed for both local enterprises and the academic environment: the former were nationalized, and universities and the Academy of Sciences were organized according to the Soviet model (Connelly, 2003) . Purchasing goods, including, of course, computers, became difficult for various reasons, such as the lack of convertible currency as well as pressure to trade only with Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries.
Finland: Forced to Productivity by the Great Eastern Neighbor
In an attempt to get out of World War II, Finland surrendered to the Soviet Union in 1944, but the country remained independent and, despite its fears, was not occupied. Nonetheless, some Finnish engineers and scientists felt a need to leave the country after 1944, consequently relocating to Sweden, the United States, or Switzerland. (Paju, 2008a) .
In Finland, as in Czechoslovakia, the communists attempted to obtain political control of the country during the postwar years. Allegedly, they even tried to change the political system during the spring or summer of 1948, but were unsuccessful; consequently, the Finnish communists' impact decreased by the end of the 1940s (Hanhimäki, 1996) . Fearing the probable Soviet reaction, Finland did not participate in the Marshall Plan, but instead concluded an individual pact, the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance," with the Soviet Union in 1948. Nevertheless, it seems that a special arrangement between Finland and the United States followed. Unlike in Czechoslovakia, the United States continued to provide loans to Finland, although its treaty with the Soviet Union initially aroused fears of the end of Finnish independence. In addition, in 1949 the U.S. Congress voted to redirect Finland's repayments of a loan it had received after World War I so that they could be used for educational exchanges between the two countries. This academic exchange program was referred to by its acronym, ASLA (Amerikan Suomen Lainan Apurahat [America's loan grants to Finland]), and was later combined with the Fulbright exchange program in Finland (Hanhimäki, 1996; Hankonen, 1994) . We will return to this program below.
In Finland, the war effort had made productivity a crucial issue in many industries. After the war, this productivity was directly impacted by forces that were opposite to the American productivity programs in western Europe. The Soviet Union forced Finland to pay heavy war reparations in industrial products during the period from 1946 to 1952. The timetable for these compelled the country to swiftly build up factories and increase the productivity in them. These Soviet demands also resulted in Finnish companies acquiring IBM technology and punch-card machines in order to accurately calculate their production obligations to the USSR. In fact, punch-card technology was booming in Finland during the late 1940s and early '50s, and it was during this period that IBM became the major punch-card vendor in the country. One could say that these punch-card machines became the country's "productivity machines"-and it is likely to have been the same in most other European countries. Computers themselves were still just a research tool (Paju, 2008a) .
Paradoxically, if the Marshall Plan encouraged increased productivity in most western European countries (Schlombs, 2008b) , Finland experienced similar effects due to the war reparations. Perhaps these could even be called a "reverse Marshall Plan," since the payments were regarded as the country's most important productivity stimulus, especially for the Finnish metal industry, which would continue selling its products to the Soviets after the war reparations had been settled in 1952. Undoubtedly, there were consequences for Finland of this kind of rapid industrialization, such as, for instance, the quality of products being regarded as insufficient for western European markets. This was one argument for increasing research and development (R&D) work in Finland beginning in the early 1950s, and it was during that time that discussions commenced on acquiring computer technology.
early Computer-BuIldIng projeCts and users In the tWo CountrIes

Continuing the Interwar Dream: The First General-Purpose Computer in Czechoslovakia
The Czechoslovak computer pioneer Antonín Svoboda (1907-80) , an engineer by training though with various other interests, spent the war years designing analog computers at the Radiation Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he met Vannevar Bush and Howard Aiken. He was also asked to summarize the R&D done during the war, which he did in his Computing Mechanisms and Linkages (Svoboda, 1948) . In 1946, he returned to Czechoslovakia with the aim of making his country a computing superpower, in the same way that Switzerland was in watches. Svoboda started by giving courses on mathematical machines at the Czech Technical University in 1948, supported by professor of mathematics Václav Hruška , who correctly grasped the importance of the new technology (Pleskot, 1955) . In 1950, computing technology was officially recognized and the Department for Information-Processing Machines was established, which formed a part of the Central Institute for Mathematics under the newly founded Centre for Research and Technological Development.
At the institute, Svoboda worked on the design of the first Czechoslovak computer, SAPO, and came up with a full design in 1951. In 1952, the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (ČSAV) was established according to the Soviet model-that is, with its own research institutes. One of these was the Central Mathematics Institute, which was renamed as the Mathematics Institute. Although Svoboda soon became the head of the rather independent Laboratory for Mathematical Machines and succeeded in motivating young people around him to work on designing computers, he could not complete the SAPO until September 1957.
The founding of Comecon in 1949 also had an indirect influence on the construction of computers in Czechoslovakia for several reasons. First, parts from the West could not always be used due both to Comecon restrictions and the lack of convertible currency (Prokš, 1995) . Furthermore, parts produced within Comecon were often unreliable, such that the design of the first Czechoslovak computer had to be changed because of it (Mapstone, 1979) . Such unreliability was a common problem in the components of early computer technology, and this was experienced in Finland also.
Although the building of computers was a declared priority of Č SAV, which in the 1950s was controlled by the Communist Party, the communist leadership of the academy was suspicious of the pro-Western Svoboda. The necessary financial support (in convertible currency), which during the 1950s had to be approved by the Communist Party, was therefore withheld. In 1958, Svoboda's group left Č SAV to eventually, in 1965, become part of a factory, while another institute was established at Č SAV to oversee the field of computing technology. A consequence of the Communist Party controlling every area of life was that international exchanges were limited. Every trip abroad had to be approved by a special committee, and these exchanges, even among communist countries, had to be planned in advance and be well justified-such as, for example, a trip to Poland being justified because it had research sources that were unobtainable in Czechoslovakia.
There were no general-purpose computers in Czechoslovakia during the early 1950s, only some simple computing devices like the ARITMA calculating punch and single-purpose computers. IBM's punch-card machines were still in use in Czechoslovakia during this time. 3 To use computers productively in the future, people had to learn how to formulate tasks to be solved by computers and they also had to learn to trust this new technology. Moreover, the promoters of computing technology, such as Svoboda and his group as well as his opponents, were well aware of the necessity of educating skilled workers so that computing centers could be established. 4 
Internationalism and the Active Interaction between Users and Producers in Finland
In the late 1940s, after having spent several years on more pressing tasks connected to war reparations, Erkki Laurila (1913-98), a key figure in early Finnish computing and later in Finnish science policy, continued his prewar studies of analog machines while a professor (since 1946) of engineering physics at the Helsinki University of Technology. Similarly to Svoboda, Laurila had a strong nationalist motivation for promoting computer research and technology within his country (Paju, 2008a) . Compared to Czechoslovakia, Finland's international exchanges were much more encouraged and even depended on. In the early 1950s, Laurila and his students were the only Finnish team researching the new mathematical machines. With the assistance of modest funding, he was able to follow developments in mathematical machines in journals and, not less importantly, from his trips to Sweden. But it was not only that Finns traveled abroad to study the latest developments in computers; foreign experts also visited Helsinki, and earlier than is at present realized. Although these visitors have not been systematically researched, they included Stig Ekelöf of Sweden in 1950 and Alwin Walther of West Germany in 1951, both having been invited by the Helsinki University of Technology. Ekelöf 's visit was even reported in Helsingin Sanomat, a leading daily newspaper. 5 Although the first working computer-an IBM 650-was installed in Finland in 1958, computing in the country dates from earlier in the decade, starting with the shared use of Swedish computers in the early 1950s. The Swedish BARK, an electromechanical-relay computer built in 1950, was the first digital computer in postwar Scandinavia, and one of the first computers in all of Europe. It was the first computer that some prominent Finnish scientists could use. Moreover, Swedes such as Ekelöf had good contacts in the United States and England since the end of the war, thus also benefiting the Finns (Paju, 2008b) .
The Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines copied a West German G1a computer, named ESKO, during the period 1954-60. It was this effort, if not earlier contacts, that integrated the Finns into the west European computer-technology community. Laurila was partly responsible for managing the ESKO project, while at the same time becoming influential in Finnish science policy thanks mostly to his involvement in developing the country's expertise in the field of nuclear energy research. The science policy was being reorganized by the government. Consequently, to some extent Laurila, unlike Svoboda, was able to gain some advantages for the country's nascent computer industry (Paju, 2008a) .
Importantly, the Committee for Mathematical Machines and the ESKO project produced several experts that were hired by two companies, IBM Finland and the Finnish Cable Works, which was an important predecessor of the Nokia Corporation. These two companies also started competing in the Finnish computer market, in which IBM became dominant during the 1960s. Nevertheless, the Finnish Cable Works and, from 1966, Nokia, fostering native expertise in electronics, would challenge IBM from the late 1970s onward with its mini-and micro-computers (Häikiö, 2001; Paju, 2008b) .
The Planned Economy as the Cause for Failures?
Unlike the Finnish position in Scandinavia, the successful industrial history of Czechoslovakia made its citizens feel superior to the rest of Comecon. For this reason, they were reluctant to share their R&D with other Comecon countries-contrary, strictly speaking, to their obligation. According to the Comecon pact, all results of R&D had to be made available to other member countries requesting it.
In a planned economy there are no real "customers," and orders work differently than in a market economy. Yet in 1950s Czechoslovakia, computing time was sold to other customers and various tasks were solved for "enterprises," many of which were institutes of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. With the entire system centrally controlled, the meaning of "order," "buy," "sell," and similar words changes significantly: orders were planned, prices were centrally determined, and demand was planned. Factories and research institutes were to cooperate rather than compete, all striving toward the same goal-a better life for everyone.
SAPO, the first Czechoslovak computer, drew much attention, but it was short-lived because of a fire less than two years after commencing operation in 1957. It was decided not to repair SAPO, especially because the design of a new computer, EPOS, was finished early in 1959 (VUMS, 1959) . One could say that because of the extensive time involved in building the computer, by the time SAPO was put into operation it was already obsolete (in this resembling the Finnish-West German experience with ESKO). SAPO, however, had very successful successors: EPOS 1 and EPOS 2, designed by the team that had worked on the earlier computer. For the development of computing in Czechoslovakia, the SAPO project was of vital importance, being quite similar to ESKO's significance in Finland.
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The SAPO project was "governmental" (top priority), which implies that the communist government was very much interested in developing computing. Having a Czechoslovak computer initially seemed like a good idea, so to achieve this, the country's leading expert, Antonín Svoboda, was sent to the United States and England on a UNRRA grant and was later entrusted with heading a department with the specific purpose of building a general-purpose computer. The first tasks envisaged for SAPO included those involving numerical mathematics and computer translation from English into Czech; one of its first actual uses was in assisting the mathematical institute with calculations for building a dam on the Moldau River. However, in comparison with the Finnish case, Czechoslovak computer building at this point had limited commercial consequences, due most probably not from a lack of recognition of its potential, but instead by the inflexibility of the centrally planned economy. 6 As late as 1965, a consortium of enterprises called ZPA (Závody přístrojů a automatizace [Enterprise for instruments and automation]) was founded (Frk & Hrbek, 1988) . The successor of Svoboda's Laboratory for Mathematical Machines then became part of the ZPA, which meant that the researchers from Svoboda's group who had not left the country, as Svoboda had for the United States in 1964, followed by many of his pupils and colleagues, could now directly participate not just in the design, but also in the construction of computers.
The interested public in Czechoslovakia was very proud of its computers. Similarly, Czechoslovakia considered itself, and was so considered by others, along with Hungary and East Germany, to be more advanced than other Comecon countries. As previously mentioned, when it was mandated during Comecon's early days that R&D was to be shared with other member countries, Czechoslovakia only reluctantly did so.
multIple Channels of Western InfluenCe
Going West: Grants for the Finns to Visit the United States
As previously mentioned, starting in 1950, grants were given to Finns to visit the United States for educational-and cultural-exchange purposes. Some grantees would also emigrate, such as Eyvind Wichmann who was mentioned above. This grant program has not been studied in detail, but to our knowledge, the first student whose visit related specifically to computing (applied mathematics) was Gustav Tollet , who, when he returned to Finland, worked for IBM Finland in the late 1950s. Another well-known student of comput-ing was Reijo Pukonen; after studying at the University of Michigan during 1956-57, upon his arrival home was hired to work for a bank that imported the first computer to be used in Finland (ASLA, 1965; Paju, 2008a) .
There were various kinds of U.S. grants. The one for the most prominent recipients was called a "leader's grant," which permitted travel in the United States for two to six months. Erkki Laurila received such a grant in 1955 in order to tour atomic-research sites. In 1956, a leader's grant was given to Teuvo Aura, a prominent economy expert and liberal politician. He visited IBM factories and in his memoirs relates how impressed he was. In 1957, the stateowned Post-Savings Bank (a major IBM punch-card user), of which Aura was the CEO, ordered the first IBM computer for Finland-an IBM 650, which, in 1958, became the first working computer in the country (Hankonen, 1994; Paju, 2008a) . It could be argued that Aura's ordering the country's first computer was part of a national techno-politics program. As a government minister, he had already been active in trade liberalization during the 1950s. His actions correspond well to what John Krige calls "co-producing American hegemony with national elites" (Krige, 2006) ; for Aura, this co-production well suited his ideology and politics.
Thus it was that although Finland did not officially participate in the Marshall Plan, it benefited from an exchange program similar to the ones sponsored by it in other countries (cf. Heinonen & Pantzar, 2002) . The Finns took advantage of the exchange program: their total of 1,700 grantees during 1950-65 was, according to a booklet by the grantees' association, "proportionally higher than that of any other foreign nation" (ASLA, 1965) . The program participants represented the elite, the future elite (graduate students), and educators, which meant that they would be in good positions to pass on their experiences in the United States. Certainly, the scale and amount of aid to Finland remained much smaller than that to some western European participants in the Marshall Plan, but as we have seen, because of the close contacts maintained between their respective experts, the aid that West Germany and Sweden received indirectly assisted the Finns also.
Furthermore, in the mid-1950s, Finnish punch-card machine users opted to wait for IBM computers instead of developing their own national computing center with Finnish researchers. Although presented as an apolitical decision, this was, in fact, a political choice to import new technology from the West. In contrast to, especially, atomic-energy technology, it seems that computing technology during the 1950s was considered or argued to be less politicaleven politically uninteresting. Also contributing to the decision to wait for IBM computers was the fact that from 1956 onward, IBM provided the Finns with computer time in its European service center in Paris and also in a private business in Stockholm (Hauru, 1956) . 7 Finland's position of being in-between the two cold war blocs was used in attempts to sell Western computers to the Soviet Union. The Swedish-American businessman Axel Wenner-Gren had founded a computer-manufacturing company in the United States, and in 1957 his employees tried establishing a company that could sell electronics products, including computers (the Alwac IIIE, later the Wegematic), to the Soviet Union. They invited Laurila to head such an operation, but he declined. In the early 1960s, the Finnish Cable Works started selling its own electronics products, but not computers, to the Soviets (Paju, 2008a) . In the 1960s, IBM was the market leader in computing in Finland. During that time and even before, U.S. influences would be used to foster national modernization, and also would be used as the basis in domestic negotiations for attaining, in the case of Finland, technological independence. These influences could also be turned against U.S.-based (if in part European) companies to create competition, as happened during the 1970s when Finnish companies such as Nokia sought to expand their sales in the Eastern Bloc .
Certainly, Finland's relatively easy exchanges with the West early on created some "brain drain." Emigration was a constant issue for policy-planners, who promoted establishing a domestic high-technology sector. From the standpoint of technology transfer this was less problematic, since the emigrants would probably stay in contact with their homeland and even perhaps return. Somewhat later, a similar situation arose with the domination by Western corporations, which was a concern of and an argument for national industrial and R&D investments, yet, on the other hand, the multinationals fostered the transfer of technology and people. Nevertheless, the issues of brain drain and the strong positions of foreign companies certainly helped form some kind of consensus for bolstering national information-technology companies such as Nokia.
Looking to the West: Underground Culture in Czechoslovakia
In Czechoslovakia, after the communist coup d'état in February 1948, most foreign companies recalled their experts and also revoked licenses granted to Czechoslovak enterprises (Frk & Hrbek, 1988) . Machines that were already in use in Czechoslovakia stayed, however. IBM, the largest player in the field of computing technology, reentered the country through the back door in 1968 Comecon countries decided to build computers that were compatible (official wording) with IBM's, resulting in the so-called Unified System of Electronic Computers. Going well beyond compatibility, however, the Unified System Electronic Computers (ECs) were copies of the IBM/360.
In Czechoslovakia, turning to the Western computing technology was quite natural, not only because of Svoboda, who brought back his expertise from the United States, but also because immediately after the war there were few examples to follow from the East or the Soviet Union: "the idea of a programcontrolled automatic digital computer came to the Soviet Union in 1947, when M. L. Bykhovsky, practically the only translator of English literature on computing at that time, published a short note in UMN . . . announcing the MARK I and ENIAC computers" (Ershov & Shura-Bura, 1980, p. 142) . The first computer in the Soviet Union was the MESM, which commenced operating in December 1951 (Gerovitch, 2002, pp. 133-134) . A year later, in December 1952, at the first conference of the Department for Information-Processing Machines, the participants were informed about the development of computers in the Soviet Union, which consequently made research in computing technology possible in Czechoslovakia.
In general, during the 1920s and '30s in Czechoslovakia, Russia had been regarded both as a Slavic "relative" and feared empire (Ripka, 1953) . After World War II, the embracing of the Soviet-style system of government by the Czechoslovak communists met with equally strong opposition from advocates of other political parties. This division is apparent in computing technology as well, in the promoting of the Western model by Svoboda on the one hand, and, on the other, sponsorship of Soviet computing technology by Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences member Jaroslav Kožešník. The ultimate winner, of course, was Western technology, which has dominated the field since 1989. Although Svoboda lost his battle and eventually chose to leave the country in 1964, the Western (read modern, more advanced) technology won out in the end. This story can also be reversed, however, by showing the disadvantages of not recognizing Soviet excellence in the areas of programming and compiler construction. 8 Western computers were sold to Comecon countries even during the cold war; in mid-1970s Czechoslovakia, for example, a third of the computers (out of a thousand) was of domestic origin, another third was from the West, and the remainder was from other Comecon countries (Vlček, 1975) . It was common knowledge among computer programmers that ECs were copies of the IBM 360-and given all the restrictions of a planned economy (either directly imposed or resulting from low motivation), poor copies at that. Therefore most Czechoslovak institutes, provided that they obtained the necessary convertible currency, tried to buy the original IBM computer instead of an EC.
Another attempt to follow Western developments was probably brought about by the foundation of the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP). IFIP was founded in 1960 under the auspices of UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and brought together national delegates from world over, including the communist countries. However, scientists from any country could only have joined as a whole institute, and in Czechoslovakia this institute was required to be an academy of sciences institute. Because of this restriction, Svoboda's group, since 1958 connected to a ministry, was excluded from participation. The IFIP also had a committee on programming languages, and although Czechoslovakia, unlike Poland, did not participate in the work of this committee, it was interested in its results. A compiler for ALGOL 60, a programming language developed by this committee, was available in Czechoslovakia by 1964. In the mid-1960s, departments for electronic computers were established in the major technical universities of the country. These departments were where compiler construction 9 was undertaken. Aside from this, ALGOL 60 was used as a model and source for the data-processing language of the EPOS computer. ALGOL 60 was also taught at the technical universities since the early 1960s. ALGOL 60 and its successors were very much appreciated by computer programmers in Czechoslovakia.
It might seem surprising how amenable the communist government was about the adoption of Western development. However, as a rule, the major scientific publications of the West were almost immediately translated into Russian, sometimes even with notes, and almost always with bibliographies of Russian translations of related Western publications and original Russian sources. This fact, among others, quite clearly illustrates the permeability of the Iron Curtain with regard to the flow of ideas, although, certainly, only select works were translated into Russian; the Iron Curtain's transparency differentiated among artifacts and ideas. Regarding computer technology during the early postwar decades as a "scientific transfer" (Aspray, 1986) thus explains its relatively easy transfer, while the actual production is more concerned with the circulation of artifacts, which crossed borders with more difficulty.
ConClusIon: negotIatIons on the Border(s) of the Cold War
Comparing the developments of computing during the early cold war years in Finland and Czechoslovakia, which were two small European nations in opposing blocs, allows us to better see and analyze how cold war realities influenced computer technology and industry in individual European countries of similar size. Therefore we argue that in European countries in 1948, political choices both deliberate and enforced wrought major consequences for computing during the ensuing decade and a half. These implications emerged rather slowly, and for a considerable time, perhaps until the end of the 1950s, the computing know-how in Czechoslovakia could be regarded as more advanced than in Finland. The former was better situated for advancing computer technology immediately after World War II because of its established industrial tradition and especially because of Antonín Svoboda, who had spent the war years studying computers in the United States, while Finland had been heavily damaged by the war, but by the mid-1950s, Finland freely benefited from the kinds of Western opportunities and exchanges that had become complicated for those in the Eastern Bloc. This situation changed even more rapidly when Western computers became a commercial product; Finland's early acquisition of computing know-how and technology was augmented by increasing numbers of purchased Western computers. Western computers could also be imported to Czechoslovakia, but this was more difficult than in Finland (see also Germuska, 2009 ).
The number of computers is one indication of the growing difference. Soon after the end of our period of research in this article , in the mid-1970s the number of computers in both countries was approximately the same, at just over a thousand. The first computer introduced in Finland in late 1958 compares well with Czechoslovakia's first in 1957. However, by the end of 1965 there were 84 computer systems in use in Finland, in addition to 65 that were on order, compared with 56 in Czechoslovakia. In mid-1973, there were 1,073 computers in Finland, compared with 885 in Czechoslovakia. According to research in 1973 by a Finnish state-appointed committee to study the dependencies created by computers and software, none of the country's existing computers originated from the Eastern Bloc (Suominen, 2000, p. 159; Valtion Atk:n, 1973, p. 96) ; at the same time, a third of the computers in Czechoslovakia originated in the West (Vlček, 1975) . Comparing the sizes of their respective populations-approximately 4.5 million in Finland and 14 million in Czechoslovakia-in relative terms of population size, there were more than three times as many computers in Finland than in Czechoslovakia.
Explanations of this difference include the facts that although Finland experienced difficult times after the war, it was geographically advantageously positioned, being much less central than Czechoslovakia, a country at the heart of Europe. The country's war effort had many consequences, presumably including its determination to resist Soviet influence. Certainly other European countries also tried to resist the Soviet Union, but their national stories varied. In Finland, for instance, war reparations to the Soviets created a "reverse Marshall Plan," at least in terms of their impact on the productivity of industries in the country. To their advantage, Finnish leaders, together with their U.S. contacts, learned from the Czechoslovak experience during the immediate postwar years (up till February 1948) and thus better resisted a communist overthrow. In addition, Finland's neighbor Sweden was deeply interested in helping maintain Finland's capabilities and Western ties in various areas of technology, industry, and society, including computing, resulting in the Finns first learning about computing through the Swedes.
Many of the differences in computing between Finland and Czechoslovakia may be highlighted by comparing their respective prominent players. Antonín Svoboda, the early Czechoslovak computer pioneer, although recognized in the West as well as by his colleagues in Prague, experienced such opposition by the communist party that he finally left the country in the summer of 1964. Prior to that, however, he had managed to establish and maintain a congenial environment in the mathematical-machines community. In such an environment, the community of computer designers and programmers seems to have been a relatively liberal one throughout the 40 years of the communist regime (Novotný, 1998) .
In Finland, Erkki Laurila could only restart his computing research at the end of the 1940s. In contrast to Svoboda, Laurila was not so much a computer scientist as a research organizer and coordinator, who also coordinated the country's nuclear-energy research. These positions established his national prominence in contributing to Finnish science and technology policy reform during the 1960s. In 1963, for his many scientific and societal achievements in promoting technology, Laurila was made a fellow of the Academy of Finland-the highest scientific post one could attain in the country. Moreover, among the academy's 12 academicians, he was the first-ever representative of the engineering sciences. Compared with Svoboda's fate, Laurila's was the exact opposite.
It was not just politics affecting technological development, but technology was also used to affect politics or form political ties. It can be argued that the commercial transfer of technology had a political element also. This seems to have been relevant for the users of technology, who in the Finnish (but not the Czechoslovak) context could operate freely and chose IBM as their "national vendor." In 1950s Finland, punch-card machines and, later, computers were productivity machines, but they were also "Westernizing machines"-that is, certain individuals and groups considered it beneficial to build ties to the West and to the United States especially. Both perceived Western technology as the best option and simultaneously wanted to buy into the political choices and particular culture of the "West." Finland's computing experts were united in this choice during the 1950s; it was only in the late 1960s and '70s did few experts emerge who wanted to increase the country's cooperation with the Soviet Union ). In the Finnish postwar setting, most experts perceived it to be important to establish technological independence: first, independence from the East, and later, greater independence from any country.
In the case of Czechoslovakia, the official positive judgment of Soviet computers and computing clashed with the underground's preference for Western solutions. Both judgments were biased, but a thorough analysis of the Soviet and Western technology effects exceeds the scope of this article. Clearly, IBM influenced the development of computing technology in Czechoslovakia, both directly and through the Comecon 's reverse-engineering copies of the IBM/360. Moreover, our results suggest that questions for future studies would be: To what extent was the Iron Curtain a technological phenomenon that both allowed and controlled technology transfer, as well as was itself produced by technological means? What role did the advancement of technology play in helping to bring down the Iron Curtain?
Finally, examining these national experiences indicates that the international history of computing should take individual national histories seriously. Regarding the international transfer of computing technology, in Europe, national differences and borders did matter; however, what needs to be studied is how they mattered. For instance, some borders, such as that of western Finland, were easy to cross, whereas in Czechoslovakia such crossings were much more difficult. Yet information flowed far easier than artifacts and materials, with the consequence that computing experts in Czechoslovakia would instead focus on software domains such as the programming-language compiler ALGOL 60. Finland's late-comer position would result in its importing mainframe computers from abroad and, with the help of continuous transfer and exchange, gradually developing expertise in various fields other than building mainframe computers, including diversifying national companies, such as Nokia, for producing electronics and small computers. In these ways, the cold war situation distinctively influenced the shaping of computing expertise in both countries.
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